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[Criticism] exhibit[s] the relations of literature—not to “life,” as something contrasted to literature, 
but to all other activities, which together with literature, are the components of life. 
—T. S. Eliot, The Sacred Wood 
9.1. Introduction 
Friedrich Schlegel’s remarks about poetry and reality are notoriously baffling: 
No poetry, no reality. . . . There is, despite all the senses, no external world 
without imagination . . . all things disclose themselves to the magic wand of 
feeling alone.1 
Whoever conceives of poetry or philosophy as individuals has a feeling for them.2 
In [Romantic poetry] there is no regard for the difference between appearance 
[Schein] and truth [Warheit].3 
Everything that rests on the opposition between appearance and reality . . . is not 
purely poetic.4 
What should one say about these observations? Perhaps that they are outlandish and eccentric? 
“Who in his right mind would argue publicly that reality rests on poetry, on a mere fiction? The 
speaker must be a madman, one who has lost all sense for the difference between what is real 
and what is merely a figment of the imagination.” Or one might say that, rather than 
philosophical observations, Schlegel’s remarks are merely “poetically exaggerated” reflections.5 
Yet another person might claim that these observations manifest a lack of mastery of our 
language. “The concept “poetry” and the concept “reality,” this respondent may say, “have 
precise semantics, and very clear criteria of application. Schlegel has clearly not mastered those 
concepts.” 
I take all these responses to be mistaken. Schlegel’s remarks about poetry and reality are 
not merely outlandish or eccentric, but deeply revealing about a prevalent confusion in 
theoretical approaches to the distinction between fiction and reality.6 Rather than mere poetic 
exaggerations, I believe that Schlegel’s pronouncements are philosophical observations that 
respond to a genuine confusion, a confusion that led him to express, time and again, what 
initially looks like eccentric views about poetry and reality.7 The confusion at stake is expressed 
by the last envisioned response to his remarks. The response of the so-called semanticist 
presupposes mistakenly that the distinction between “fiction” and “reality” is fixed “once and for 
all” by a criterion, which is determined prior to any application of those concepts. Our imagined 
semanticist, and, I think, some contemporary philosophers of art, assume that the distinction 
between fiction and reality is and must be fixed independently of the ordinary practices of using 
the terms “fiction” and “reality” to mean something in specific situations. 
I argue that we should understand Schlegel’s knotty remarks about poetry and reality as 
addressing this assumption. I propose that we think of them as forming a kind of “transcendental 
criticism,” to borrow Kant’s label for his diagnosis of, and challenge to, what he takes to be a 
“natural and inevitable illusion” of the human mind.8 Since the assumption I just mentioned 
shapes a line of thought in contemporary aesthetics, Schlegel’s concern with this illusion is as 
relevant today as it was in his day. 
We can begin to see the depth of Schlegel’s concern by first tracing some affinities 
between his thought and Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. This should not be too 
surprising. The surface similarities between Wittgenstein’s remarks in Philosophical 
Investigations and in the aphorisms collected in Culture and Value, and the pronouncements in 
Schlegel’s writings are nothing short of remarkable. Here is a very limited sample: 
1. One should really do philosophy only as poetry.9 
Poetry and philosophy should be united.10 
2. Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces 
anything.—Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain.11 
The main thing [in philosophy] is to know something and to say it. The attempt to 
prove or even to explain it is quite superfluous in most cases. . . . There is 
doubtless more difficulty in stating something than in explaining it.12 
3. The work of the philosopher consists in assembling reminders.///13 The aspects 
of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and 
familiarity. . . . We fail to be struck by what, once seen, is most striking and most 
powerful.14 
Whoever knows this cannot be reminded often enough that he knows it. All of the 
highest truths of every kind are altogether trivial; and for this very reason nothing 
is more necessary than to express them ever anew . . . so that it will not be 
forgotten that they are still there.15 
4. One might also give the name “philosophy” to what is possible before all new 
discoveries and inventions. /// If one tried to advance theses in philosophy, it 
would never be possible to debate them, because everyone would agree to them.16 
To those who knew it already, philosophy of course brings nothing new; but only 
through it does it become knowledge and thereby assume a new form.17 
I quote Stanley Cavell’s description of his pairings of quotes as a commentary on my 
own pairings: “In each case the first member of the pair is from Wittgenstein, the second is . . . 
either from Friedrich or from August Wilhelm Schlegel. . . . That these figures take the 
preoccupations of Wittgenstein’s sensibility deep into . . . German Romanticism fits my sense of 
his continuing the Romantic’s response to the psychic threat of skepticism.”18 Although a 
handful of scholars pointed to certain parallels between the German Romantics and 
Wittgenstein’s late philosophy,19 Cavell is probably the only one20 to have acknowledged the 
depth of the legacy of the early German Romantics in Wittgenstein, or the Wittgensteinian spirit 
of the early German Romantics.21 
The task of this paper is to advance what Cavell has only started on this front, with the 
aim of shedding light on Schlegel’s response to skepticism and to traditional philosophy, on his 
concept “wit,” and, above all, on the way we should, following him, approach a family of 
concepts—“poetry” or “fiction,” “reality,” and “feeling.” For that purpose, section 2 explores the 
affinities between the Schlegelian spirit and the Wittgensteinian spirit, and section 3 explains 
how these commonalities, when applied to a confusion about poetry and reality, shed light on the 
remarks that open the paper. 
9.2. The Schlegelean and the Wittgensteinian Spirit 
In addition to affinities between the content and the form of Schlegel’s mature project and 
Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, their respective philosophical methods reveal a related “spirit.” 
Wittgenstein described the methods of his late philosophical writings as closely related to 
methods in aesthetics.22 That Schlegel’s methods are analogous to methods in aesthetics is not 
news. I am convinced that those methods also resemble Wittgenstein’s methods in some 
important respects, and that they are so similar because both Wittgenstein and Schlegel 
understand traditional philosophy and skepticism in a closely related manner.23 
Why should philosophy proceed, as it were, “aesthetically”? Here is how G. E. Moore 
remembers Wittgenstein’s reflection on that matter: 
Reasons, he said, in Aesthetics, are “of the nature of further descriptions”: e.g., 
you can make a person see what Brahms was driving at by showing him lots of 
different pieces by Brahms, or by comparing him with a contemporary author; 
and all that Aesthetics does is “to draw your attention to a thing,” to “place things 
side by side.” . . . And he said that the same sort of “reasons” were given not only 
in Ethics, but also in Philosophy.24 
Schlegel and Wittgenstein belong to a tradition, which suspects that the identification of 
aesthetic reasons and general rules is unfaithful to the practice of aesthetic appreciation.25 For 
aesthetic communication does not aim to achieve agreement in opinions or beliefs about the work 
at stake,26 but at allowing another to share the critic’s love for (or dissatisfaction with) the work 
for being beautiful (or ugly) in this or that particular way. But to permit another to share the 
critic’s vision, appreciation, and love for this particular work, the critic must allow her 
interlocutor to see the particular aspects that make it powerful in the way that they do. The critic 
must enable her interlocutor to stand to the work in a relation that allows her to see in it what the 
critic sees in it, and to feel for it what the critic feels for it. 
Wittgenstein suggests that this aim requires that we align the work we love with other 
works that are similar to it, and dissimilar from it in revealing ways: works by the same artist, 
works belonging to the same genre, or to the same historical period.27 Schlegel seems to agree. 
We should not expect philosophy, he argues, to give us an absolute, a priori definition of art, but 
we can, and perhaps should expect it to help us “order the given artistic experiences and the 
existing artistic principles . . . and raise the appreciation of art, extend it with the help of a 
thoroughly learned history of art.”28 Nor can we answer “the simplest and most immediate 
questions . . . without the deepest consideration and the most erudite history of art.”29 You 
understand “Sapphic poems” only when you compare them with Petrarch’s and with Horatian 
poems.30 And the comparison of different works, particularly a historical comparison, is, for 
Schlegel, the essence of criticism.31 
Wittgenstein takes a similar method of comparison to be necessary in philosophy too. “It 
is not our aim to refine or complete the system of rules for the use of our words.”32 Instead, the 
ordinary uses of words (“language games”) that he invites us to observe and imagine are “set up 
as objects of comparison which are meant to throw light on the facts of our language by way not 
only of similarities, but also of dissimilarities.”33 
It is all too tempting to misinterpret Wittgenstein on this point. One might think that he 
pursues philosophy by comparing different ways we use words because he believes that 
“meaning is use,” a slogan often associated with PI §43. This may well be true, depending on 
how we read §43. I read this passage as suggesting neither that understanding the meaning of a 
word or a sentence requires a pragmatic analysis over and above a semantics and syntax,34 nor 
that the meaning of a word is determined simply by a certain context.35 Rather, according to 
Wittgenstein, we cannot understand the meaning of a word or a sentence in isolation from the 
particular way(s) the word or the sentence can be used to mean something specific on a 
particular occasion. In order to grasp the meaning of a word we need to remind ourselves, to 
imagine or observe, how it can be used by someone to mean something specific. 
What motivates Wittgenstein to align meaning and use in this way is not a wish to guide 
our understanding, but a concern about a prevalent confusion about meaning, which Cavell calls 
“an illusion of meaning.” A person is under this illusion when he “imagines himself to be saying 
something when he is not, to have discovered something, when he has not.”36 What happens 
when a person “hallucinates what he or she means;”37 What happens when, as Wittgenstein puts 
it, she uses her words “outside of a language-game?” 
Usually, when a person is under this illusion she fails to use the words in a way that 
grants them their necessary connections to some other words and human practices. I might speak 
outside of a language game if, for instance, I say, “Only I know my feelings” in a way that is 
detached from any specific situation in which it can make sense (independently, for example, of 
any anger I might feel toward someone, perhaps my therapist, or my mother, for ascribing to me 
certain feelings that I either don’t believe I have, or am not willing or capable of ascribing to 
myself). I use this sentence outside of a language game if, detached from any such practice in 
which it naturally makes sense, I use it to mean (I imagine that it means) that the feelings of 
another are accessible to no one other than the feeling person. 
We might also speak outside of a language game if we try to use words to mean both 
what they ordinarily mean, and something “special,” “unordinary.” This double use is 
characteristic of the skeptic’s talk—both the skeptic who doubts the existence of the external 
world, and the skeptic who doubts our knowledge of other minds.38 The plight of the skeptic is 
this: her inability to mean what she says is internal to her way of using the words she is using.39 
The success of the skeptic40 depends on her using words both in the ordinary way and in a 
technical way. On the one hand, the skeptic must use her words in a “special” way if her words 
are to gain the kind of generality she needs. Only if the expression, “Only I know what I feel” is 
severed from any specific ordinary context of uttering it to express anger about some 
infringement of privacy, about an imposition of feelings that we are unwilling to accept, and so 
on, can the skeptic claim that it has a “general reach,” or that it implies a theory about the 
metaphysical nature of all feelings (“private”), and about the epistemic impossibility (of any 
person) to know other minds. On the other hand, the skeptic must also insist that she uses her 
words in the way in which they are ordinarily used, if she is to be justified in claiming that what 
she has “discovered” (the nature of feelings and of knowledge) “conflicts” with our everyday 
understanding of feelings and knowledge. Otherwise, the skeptic cannot achieve her aim of 
pulling the rug out from under what we usually say and believe. Properly responding to the 
skeptic requires that we enable her to see that putting the question the way she does—as both 
ordinary and special—puts her own question into question. 
So Wittgenstein uses “an aesthetic method” in philosophy—he reminds us of what we 
ordinarily say and do, by way of aligning different uses as “objects of comparison”—because he 
believes that, especially as philosophers, we are prone to be subject to an illusion about the way 
we use our words, and about the meaning of our words.41 The illusions and misunderstandings 
that Wittgenstein is concerned with cannot be refuted by a counterargument, or by a proof or a 
rule that shows the necessary, systematic, and fixed nature of language and meaning. “The 
confusions which occupy us arise when language is like an engine idling, not when it is doing 
work.”42 This kind of confusion can be resolved only by reminding the speakers who use 
language indolently how language actually works, how it must work if it is to do any work.43 
Such a work of reminders has to be of a special kind because of the great “urge to 
misunderstand,” because of the tendency to be bewitched by the workings of our language, and 
because “the aspects of things that are most important for us,” particularly, those that allow 
words to mean, “are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity. . . . The real foundations 
of his enquiry do not strike man at all. Unless that fact has at some time struck him.—And this 
means: we fail to be struck by what, once seen, is most striking and most powerful.”44 
One way of allowing the most familiar to be striking is to compare a certain use of words 
with other imagined and real uses until it attains “complete clarity.”45 But once this complete 
clarity is achieved, “philosophical problems should completely disappear. The real discovery is 
the one . . . that gives philosophy peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions which 
bring itself into question.”46 The only resolution of skepticism is its dissolution by means of 
disillusionment.47 
You may think that Schlegel can in no way be viewed as responding to the skeptic, either 
in a “Wittgensteinian” or in any other way. And you might think so because you believe that 
Schlegel himself is a skeptic. Schlegel undoubtedly doubts the possibility of absolute 
foundations48—in a spirit similar to Wittgenstein’s doubt about the existence of an absolute, 
fixed system of rules as the foundation of language. And he questions the possibility of an 
absolute comprehension of the world—just as Wittgenstein believes that explanations “come to 
an end.”49 
But in spite of these “doubts,” neither Wittgenstein nor Schlegel is a (traditional) skeptic, 
surely not a skeptic about the traditional objects of skepticism. Both of them take skepticism very 
seriously, but take it seriously because they view it as confused in ways that represent some of 
the prevalent confusions of traditional philosophy itself. Schlegel’s understanding of skepticism 
resembles Wittgenstein’s: he also recognizes the power of a certain philosophical use of words to 
lead us astray,50 and holds that a “corrupt manner in which language is used” can easily lead to 
mistaken systematizing enterprises.51 And Schlegel seems also to share Wittgenstein’s 
understanding of our great urge to misunderstand the workings of language: 
I wanted to point out that words often understand themselves better than do those 
who use them, wanted to draw attention to the fact that there must be secret 
societies among philosophical words, words that, like a host of spirits sprung 
forth too early, confuse everything, and exert invisible force of the world spirit 
even on those who do not wish to acknowledge them. . . . I had to think in terms of 
a popular medium, in order to bond chemically this holy, delicate, fleeting, airy, 
fragrant, and as it were imponderable thought. Otherwise, how severely might this 
thought have been misunderstood, since it is only through its well-understood use 
an end could be put to all the understandable misunderstanding?52 
That Schlegel is not a skeptic, but a subtle critic of skepticism who challenges who 
challenges it by employing some of Wittgenstein’s later terms of criticism is supported by his 
following observations: “Eclecticism and Skepticism lead to Mysticism, the abyss into which 
everything sinks.”53 But abyssal as skepticism may be, no counterargument can silence it. 
Properly responding to the skeptic requires that we allow her to see the incoherence internal to 
her own position: 
The three positions [eclecticism, skepticism, and mysticism] not only mutually 
reciprocally annihilate each other, but each also destroys itself. It is a foregone 
conclusion that the consistent skeptic must end in remaining silent and ceasing to 
think, and thus finally equals zero. He would also have to cease refuting because 
he refutes himself, or else he would have to realize that he can only refute what is 
refutable.54 
This self-contradiction is not externally imposed on the skeptical position, but generated 
by the position’s internal instability: “The mystic is freer than the skeptic and the empiricist; he 
begets his contradiction. The others allow their contradictions to be dictated to them.”55 And the 
source of this instability lies in the skeptic’s use of words—her use of a “special language,” 
which she tries to (indeed, must) deny if skepticism is to get off the ground: “All three—the 
skeptics, the empiricists, and the mystics—have their own languages and yet all three protest 
against jargon.”56 
You might think that even if this is a plausible reconstruction of Schlegel’s approach to 
skepticism, this is only another indication that he is nonetheless a kind of skeptic—the kind of 
skeptic who doubts the representational power of philosophical language. Azade Seyhan writes: 
“For Friedrich Schlegel . . . irony points to the failure of philosophy to represent the infinite 
adequately.”57 This is undoubtedly true. But the literature that emphasizes the Romantic ironic 
recognition of the limitations of philosophical language tends to undermine important nuances. 
Schlegel repudiates neither reason nor philosophical language as such. Nor does he merely 
remind philosophers of the limitations of this language as philosophical language. Alert as he is 
to different uses of language, Schlegel calls on us to be cautious about a certain use of 
philosophical language, governed by an illusory picture of language, philosophy, and rationality 
(i.e., the picture of these three as grounded in absolute foundations, or as unlimited manners of 
cognizing and articulating the Absolute).58 Though suspicious and critical of this use (or misuse) 
of philosophical language, he also reminds us that we can do philosophy in a different spirit, 
positively, not only negatively by pointing to philosophy’s limitations: “Wouldn’t it be 
worthwhile trying now to introduce the concept of the positive into philosophy as well?”59 
As tempting as the picture of philosophy that often drives us to transcend the limitation of 
language and reason may be, we can avoid its pitfalls, while still using philosophical language. 
For, though limited, philosophical language also has an inherent potential, a potential embodied 
in its necessary reliance on the ordinary use of language. Since language as we ordinarily use it is 
teeming with (positive) possibilities that philosophy can legitimately and correctly use for 
achieving its (philosophy’s) own aims, the first task we must undertake, if we are to direct 
philosophy back from its illusory path to a meaningful pursuit, is to remind ourselves of our 
ordinary use of words. 
Schlegel’s antidote to the illusory use of language is reflected by his style of writing. Not 
unlike Wittgenstein, Schlegel chooses a dialogical and conversational style (he writes fragments 
that communicate with fragments written by others, fragments that embody the voice of an 
opposing interlocutor, and a dialogue).60 Like Wittgenstein’s dialogical voice, Schlegel’s 
approach allows him to respond to a host of confused interlocutors. He claims that when 
philosophy is done properly it is done as “symphilosophy” between two interlocutory voices, and 
that symphilosophy is, fundamentally, intrapersonal—a recasting of two voices internal to the 
self: 
If in communicating a thought, one fluctuates between absolute comprehension 
and absolute incomprehension, then this process might already be termed a 
philosophical friendship. For it’s no different with ourselves. Is the life of a 
thinking human being anything else than a continuous inner symphilosophy?61 
Both Schlegel and Wittgenstein suggest that the “urge to misunderstand,” and misuse 
words is neither rare, nor exclusive to the skeptic. A skeptical voice, “the skeptic in oneself,”62 
inheres in all of us. We are all prone to certain confusions and illusions that affect our use of 
words. The “voice of temptation” is as much a part of each self as the “voice of correction.”63 
Wittgenstein aims to “correct” the part of us that gave in to temptation by inviting us to 
observe and imagine how we ordinarily use words. Schlegel uses a related philosophical 
approach. He also invites us, I think, to observe and imagine how we use certain words, and 
make certain distinctions, and how those distinctions express what we can and cannot do with 
those words. For example, he calls on us to resist the attempt to define art überhaupt, but instead 
to reconstruct it before our eyes through a detailed analysis and comparison of works.64 Instead 
of talking about writing as such, or about the writer, we should distinguish between different 
kinds of writers, for example, between the analytic writer and the synthetic writer.65 To 
understand suicide, we need to remind ourselves in what circumstances we call it an action, and 
in what circumstances we call it an accident, and what we must mean when we say that it is 
wrong.66 Reminding ourselves of the distinction between folly and madness has both 
philosophical and political consequences.67 And to understand the novel, the best we can do is to 
compare Shakespeare with Boccaccio, the two of them with Cervantes, and all of them with a 
detailed reading of Goethe. Above all, in a Wittgensteinian spirit, Schlegel claims that 
philosophy can teach us nothing new. And yet only through philosophy do we come to know, to 
be reminded of and become familiar with, what it teaches us—what we have always already 
“known.”68 
Schlegel takes up this “work of reminders” also, I believe, by reviving the power of wit, a 
power that he regards as profoundly philosophical: “Even philosophy has blossoms. That is, its 
thoughts; but one can never decide if one should call them witty or beautiful.”69 Wit does not 
have the special power of reminding us of what we are already familiar with but for the most part 
fail to notice simply because, as a matter of fact, it is a figure of speech that is used in ordinary 
conversation. Wit’s special force lies in its characteristic way of behaving. For it is wit that, 
through humor and surprise, often startles us, challenges what we take for granted, and, by so 
doing, allows us to look at our life and words from a fresh perspective, and thus to see, as if for 
the first time, what we are already familiar with.70 The meaning of “a witty idea which is 
enigmatic to the point of needing to be solved should be immediately and completely clear as 
soon as it’s been hit upon.”71 Once achieving complete clarity, Schlegelian wit dissolves (rather 
than directly solves) the problem it was meant to address. For like philosophy, wit “brings us 
nothing new”—it only puts us in touch with what we are already familiar with by showing it in a 
new light. Through the surprising power of wit, the ordinary becomes for the first time an object 
of awareness and knowledge.72 And so, “imagination and wit are everything to you!”73 
Schlegel’s witty remarks function similarly to Wittgenstein’s grammatical remarks. And 
their success is gauged in similar ways. A grammatical investigation is successful if an 
interlocutor can use the philosopher’s reminding summons to test herself, if the interlocutor can 
accept the invitation to share words and world.74 For Schlegel too, the mark of a good, successful 
philosophical approach, “the criterion of authentic philosophy,” is not its “applicability,” but 
“communicability.”75 One of the “universally valid and fundamental laws of written 
communication” is that “one should really be able to communicate it and share it with somebody, 
not simply express oneself. Otherwise it would be wiser to keep silent.”76 Wittgenstein’s and 
Schlegel’s ways of comparing different circumstances in which we ordinarily use the words that 
the philosopher also aims to use is not a way to defend common sense in an antiskeptical way, or 
to refute traditional philosophy. Their appeal to the ordinary is a solicitation of agreement, an 
invitation to share their world. 
9.3. Poetry and Reality 
The remarks at the opening of this chapter should also be read as what I call “witty” or 
“grammatical” remarks.77 They are meant to remind us of the ways in which we ordinarily 
approach the distinction between reality and fiction, and what we say when we ordinarily speak 
about our feelings for fictional works and for “real” situations and people.78 I suspect that 
Schlegel uses those reflections on poetry, reality, and feeling as reminders of that sort because he 
recognizes a few related tendencies in theoretical considerations of (1) the distinction between 
poetry and reality, and (2) the distinction between our feelings for poetic works (and the fictional 
characters in them), and our feelings for our fellow human beings, and “real life” circumstances. 
Different as these two distinctions are, Schlegel’s remarks suggest that the prevalent 
theoretical approaches to both of these distinctions are based on a shared confused picture: 
Schlegel points to a tendency, manifest primarily in philosophy and literary criticism, to think 
that poetry and reality, as well as our feelings for the former and our feelings for the latter, are 
distinguished once and for all by a fixed criterion, which is determined independently of our life 
with these terms. 
I take this prevalent approach to the distinction between the real and the fictional to be 
structurally analogous (but by no means identical) to the skeptic’s approach that I described 
above. And for that reason, I regard both of them as calling for a similar response. This is what I 
mean: The skeptical doubt about the existence of the external world, on the one hand, and the 
confusion about reality and fiction, on the other, are not similar in content. I do not claim that the 
latter raises a question about our epistemic capacity to tell reality from fiction, or that it 
challenges our capacity to ever know that what we experience is real rather than fictional. Nor do 
I claim that the philosophers whose views are shaped by this confusion are searching, like the 
external world skeptic, for some experiential “marks and features”79 to distinguish reality from 
fiction. But the assumption that governs their confusion is analogous to the one that governs the 
skeptical confusion, and the source of the two is a misunderstanding about meaning. 
The confusion at stake in this paper is guided by the mistaken belief that every judgment 
in which we apply certain concepts is essentially underdetermined if the judgment is not 
grounded in a stable determination of these concepts prior to their applications. In short, this 
picture is based on a misunderstanding of the way language works. One might be prone to this 
confusion because of an inclination to think that language is based on an absolute foundation. 
But Schlegel suggests that viewing language in this manner expresses “a fad for the absolute 
[Die Liebhaberei fürs Absolute],” from which we must find “a way out,”80 just as we must 
overcome the urge to ground philosophy in absolute foundations.81 Because this approach to 
fiction and reality is grounded in a misunderstanding of the meanings of words, and their 
necessary relation to ordinary language, the proper response to it is not a refutation, but the 
response that I take Schlegel to offer—a response that allows his interlocutor to recognize for 
herself how words acquire their meanings when we use them ordinarily. 
It seems that Schlegel found a variant of this attitude towards poetry and reality to be the 
picture that he himself, the early Schlegel, had been captive to a few years before he wrote the 
statements that open this chapter. The remarks about poetry and reality, from his so-called mid to 
late period, starting approximately in 1797,82 may be designed to challenge the picture that had 
shaped the early Schlegel’s faith in the absolute distinction between reality and poetry. They 
challenge, particularly, his early belief that, in its perfected mode (exhibited in the works of 
antiquity), poetry is “an utterly peculiar activity of the human mind; it is distinguished from 
every other activity by eternal boundaries [because it is the expression of] an eternal human 
objective . . . that is only indirectly connected to man.”83 Schlegel uses the remarks quoted at the 
opening of this chapter in part to take issue with the faith in the possibility of an objective 
science that could irrevocably distinguish the “real”—the everyday life of ordinary men and 
women who live in actual, empirical surroundings—from the absolutely objective, pure, and 
self-sufficient realm of poetry and art, the embodiment of the “ideal.” Proclaiming that without 
poetry there is no reality, that the distinction between reality and appearance is not poetical, and 
that “life and society should become poetic”84 may be a way of raising a question about the 
assumption that “there [is] more than one world”85—the real world and the world presented by 
the art of fiction—a self-sufficient, “isolated,” ideal world, which is only “indirectly [Mittelbar] 
related to man.” 
Perhaps surprisingly, the picture of poetry and reality that I take Schlegel’s remarks to 
address does not shape only his early view, but also a contemporary debate in aesthetics: the 
debate about whether the emotions we feel for fictions are real and rational. Before I introduce 
this debate, two qualifications are in order. First, I do not claim that Schlegel had in mind this 
contemporary debate in aesthetics. And yet, I suspect, both that he was responding to a related 
illusory picture, the one that shaped his early thought, and that his reflections on poetry and 
reality include resources for clearing away the confusion in the contemporary literature about 
fiction. Due to limitations of space, in this paper I merely gesture towards the way in which these 
resources can address the contemporary discussion. Second, I do not argue that the parties to this 
debate presuppose, like the early Schlegel, that “poetry” and “reality” (in their terms, “fiction” 
and “reality”) are two distinct “domains” or “worlds.” But I do think that a central line in this 
debate presupposes that our emotional responses to fiction and our emotional responses to “real” 
situations and individuals are distinguished by means of a single criterion, which is determined 
in isolation from the ways in which we ordinarily engage with fictions and with “real life,” and 
from the criteria that these engagements give rise to. Although this confusion and the confusion 
of the early Schlegel are distinct, I think that they share an understanding (well, a 
misunderstanding) of the meaning of words as determined a priori, all by itself, independently of 
what we do and mean when we use language. 
How does this confusion enter into the contemporary literature? In taking for granted that 
an emotion can be “real” only if it involves a belief in the existence of its object,86 some parties 
to this debate assume that what is “real” and what is “fictional” (what is merely part of a game of 
make-believe, to use the terms that Kendall Walton contributed to this debate) is already 
determined, independently of what we actually do and say when we are engaged with “real” 
people, and with fictions, and the criteria we use when engaged in such ways.87 For example, 
Walton holds that we do not “really” feel, say, pity and pain for Anna Karenina, but feel them 
only as part of a “make-believe” game because “real” emotions always require a belief in the 
existence of the objects of those emotions.88 Walton thus assumes that the distinction between 
“real” and “fictional” emotions is set independently of any language game.89 
In contrast to this line of thought, Schlegel’s reflections on poetry and reality in his mid 
to late period suggest that the distinction between poetry and reality should not be regarded as 
obvious. There are reasons not to take it for granted, but to explore its nature, just as there are 
reasons to explore and question the “Greek separation of all things into the divine and the human 
. . . the Roman dualism of At Home and At War. And the modern [distinction between] the world 
of the present and the world of the hereafter, as if there were more than one world.”90 
Why is it not to be taken for granted? For one, poetry and reality do not seem to be 
distinguished in the same way that ordinary objects, like tables, trees, or birds, are distinguished. 
If someone says, “This is a goldfinch,” it is reasonable in certain circumstances to ask him how 
he knows that it is a goldfinch and not a goldcrest. If such a doubt arises, the speaker, if he 
knows what he is talking about, can easily pacify the doubt. “I know that it is a goldfinch 
because, though goldfinches and goldcrests both have a red head, there are no goldcrests in those 
areas,” or “Goldcrests have pinkish-red head, but goldfinches have wine-red heads.” No matter 
how “alike” goldfinches and goldcrests are, there are clear “marks and features” that distinguish 
the one from the other, marks and features that we can come to know if we receive the right kind 
of training, and if we are situated properly. It is questionable whether there are similar marks and 
features to distinguish the fictional from the real, if any doubt arises. What can I possibly answer 
Betsy, my neighbor, if she asks me how I know that the neighborhood we live in is real, rather 
than the setting of a novel? For her to ask that question would bespeak a misunderstanding of the 
nature of the distinction. 
As much as it differs from the distinction between goldfinches and goldcrests, the 
distinction between fiction and reality also importantly differs from the distinction between mere 
appearance and reality, between what is not real and what is real, or between a real goldfinch 
and a decoy91 (as well as between dreaming and waking life, the distinction that interests the 
external world skeptic). For what is fictional, poetry, is (or should be) at least as real as our “real 
life”: “Works whose ideal doesn’t have as much living reality and, as it were, personality for the 
artist as does his mistress or his friend are best left unwritten. At any rate, they do not become 
works of art.”92 Schlegel also reminds us that our “real,” everyday life often presents itself to us 
as a work of fiction: “Even in life . . . the common often makes a very romantic and pleasant 
appearance.”93 And poetry itself, he claims, functions more often then not in nothing other than 
our everyday reality: “It is a permanent feature of the highest poetry to appear in holy wrath and 
express its full power even in the strangest material, that is, everyday reality.”94 
By making these and other remarks, Schlegel suggests that whether what we do, undergo, 
or encounter is real or fictional can be determined only in light of our language games with 
fiction—only in light of what we ordinarily do or don’t do when we are engaged with fictions, 
for those language games alone embody the criteria of what can and cannot count as either 
fiction or reality. Schlegel proposes that any effort to use the terms “real” and “fictional”95 as if 
their meaning is determined in isolation from the particular practices in which specific speakers 
use them could only result in our failing to mean what we say. Just as the activity of modern 
poetry lacks “a firm basis,”96 but depends instead on the activity of each individual poet, so too 
what counts as “poetry” and what counts as “reality” lacks a “firm basis,” but depends instead on 
particular uses of the terms. 
But this does not imply that the meaning of our concepts is arbitrary, subjectivist or even 
merely conventional. Schlegel claims that even though modern poetry has no “firm basis” other 
than the creative talent of individual poets, it is not merely arbitrary, or “idealist”—it is not the 
expression only of the ideals, or the mind, of the particular poets who create it, as contrasted with 
reality. Rather, modern poetry does not only facilitate genuine realism, a true expression of the 
reality in which modern poets live, but it also constitutes “the harmony of the ideal and the 
real.”97 Similarly, even though meaning is not determined once and for all, independently of 
what we mean when we use words in particular situations, it is not arbitrary, subjectivist, or 
conventional. Cavell writes, “I am trying to bring out . . . that any form of life and every concept 
integral to it has an indefinite number of instances and directions of projection; and that this 
variation is not arbitrary. Both the ‘outer’ variance and the ‘inner’ constancy are necessary if a 
concept is to accomplish its tasks.”98 Even if our concepts and words are infinitely open to 
revision, even if they are so plastic as to allow infinite yet unidentified instances to fall under 
them, what would fall under any concept is not arbitrary or subjective. Unless a certain object or 
context invites the application of an existing concept, which has not yet been applied to this 
object or context, the application would not be legitimate. Properly using our words requires that 
we be attuned to those contexts that allow them to be projected onto and those that do not. Being 
ungrounded in any list of necessary and sufficient rules or conditions, and being, essentially, an 
intersubjective activity of particular speakers does not prevent language, our language, from 
being normatively grounded rather than arbitrary. 
Notice that Schlegel’s remarks about poetry and reality are not to be read as a refutation 
of the philosopher who is subject to the confused picture about fiction and reality that I am 
attempting to flesh out in this section. Instead, he invites his interlocutor to share his own world, 
a world that is made perspicuous, is animated and maintained by the fictional works we are 
engaged with as much as it is animated and maintained by the “real” people we interact with.99 
And he invites the interlocutor (and us, his readers) to do so by reminding us that seeing how the 
words “poetry,” “reality,” and “feeling” acquire their meaning, and recognize the criteria for 
applying them in different situations only requires that we observe the ordinary practices of 
reading and appreciating, of meeting friends to engage in a “lively discussion about a new 
play”100 and so on. 
Instead of offering a counterargument, Schlegel wishes to remind anyone who is prone to 
the confusion about poetry and reality how people use, in ordinary circumstances, the terms, 
which the philosopher also attempts to use. This is what I take Schlegel to be doing when he 
asks, “Is there an art worthy of the name if it does not have the power to bind the spirit of love 
with its magic word, to make the spirit of love follow and obey it?”101 The question whether the 
emotions we feel for fictional characters and narrative are “real” seems to lose its hold on us 
when we remind ourselves that we hardly ever call a work an artwork, let alone a great work of 
art, if we do not take it to inspire “the spirit of love,” if we do not take it both to be capable of 
moving its audience, and to merit the audience’s love and admiration. What sense does it make 
to insist that whatever we feel for fictional characters cannot be “real” but a “quasi-emotion” 
because we believe that those characters do not “really” exist, if one of the primary ways we 
have for determining what counts as fictional works is to gauge whether they merit feelings of 
sympathy, love or admiration? 
Schlegel writes, “The first principle in love is to have a sense for one another, and the 
highest principle, faith in each other.”102 Rather than a belief in the existence of the beloved—the 
requirement of real feelings for anything according to the contemporary aestheticians I 
mentioned above—the requirement for real love is a sense for, and faith in the other. That is 
what we seem to demand of real love, and perhaps other emotions, at least in many 
circumstances. The sorrow I feel for Anna, then, might not be real if, for example, I think that 
she deserves her dismal end, or if I think that she brought it on herself. My sorrow is not real, in 
other words, if I have no faith in her decisions and actions. This means that there are criteria for 
distinguishing “real” emotions from “unreal” ones (where the latter refers to faked or insincere 
emotions). But these criteria are part of the ordinary grammar of the concepts of these emotions, 
part of the life surrounding our emotional lives. They are not determined independently of the 
ways in which we usually respond to, behave around, and talk about our emotional lives, and 
they suggest that our emotions for fictions often count as real. Assuming that whether our 
emotions for fictions are “real” depends solely on whether they involve a belief in the existence 
of their objects ignores the variety of criteria that we ordinarily use to determine whether an 
emotion is real. Indeed, sometimes we must conclude that an appearance of emotion is not real, 
but only a mere appearance, because it does not involve such a belief. But Walton’s assumption 
ignores the fact that, for the most part, whether or not a seeming emotion is real, apparent, or 
only a part of a make-believe game does not depend on the existence of such a belief, but on a 
host of other criteria.103 
When the declaration “no poetry, nor reality” opens a remark about the necessity of 
feeling for properly responding to actual individual human beings and to the world as such, it 
cannot mean that there is no difference between poetry and reality.104 Instead of reading this 
passage as obliterating the distinction, or as suggesting that there is no way out of poetic and 
linguistic constructions, it would be more natural to read it as proposing that we learn how to 
properly respond to our fellow human beings (and to the “external world” of which we are a 
part), when we become attuned to poetry, and, at the same time, we learn how to properly 
respond to poetry, when we learn how to be responsive to our fellow human beings, and to the 
world as such. “Whoever conceives of poetry or philosophy as individuals has a feeling for 
them.”105 
Writing about poetry or fiction philosophically, which drives us to draw absolute 
boundaries between art, as belonging to an “ideal” world, and life as belonging to the “real” 
world, or to ask whether the sorrow and pity we feel for, say, Anna Karenina is real, often leads 
us astray from, and renders us oblivious to, the way we ordinarily use these words. The way we 
use these words philosophically is often entangled with a fantasy that they are independent of 
what we say and mean when we utter them. This is why leading these “words back from their 
metaphysical to their everyday use [auf ihre alltägliche Verwendung]” is not an easy task.106 
Acknowledging the “highest truths,” the most basic and ordinary structures of care and concern, 
which allow our words to have the meanings they have, not independently of us, but insofar as 
we mean them in the ways that we do, is particularly exacting when we do philosophy. But as 
exacting as it may be, the grammatical or witty investigation of words is worth the effort. For it 
not only brings out the emptiness of so much of our philosophical use of words, but also our 
investments in the practices to which our words belong, and the different concerns, cares, and 
commitments embodied in our ordinary use of them. As J. L. Austin puts it, “Our common stock 
of words embodies all the distinctions men have found worth drawing, and the connections they 
have found worth making.”107 Rather than wishing to obliterate the distinction between poetry 
and reality, or to suggest that “art . . . does not need to point beyond itself,”108 when making the 
remarks that open the paper, and many others that relate to them, Schlegel meant to remind us of 
how intimate we are with the fictions we read (and hear, and behold, and experience) on an 
everyday basis, and to invite us to feel this intimacy for ourselves. 
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